Jonathan Vogel advocates the Explanationist response to the Deceiver Argument for skepticism about the external world.

1. Jonathan Vogel advocates the Explanationist response to the Deceiver Argument for skepticism about the external world. On the basis of the information available on the slides, it is most likely that Vogel counts as:

a. an idealist.

b. a skeptic about the external world.

c. an indirect realist about the external world.

d. an anti-realist about knowledge.

2. Michael Huemer’s ‘How Can You Get Outside Your Head?’ argument argument concludes that ‘we have no knowledge of the physical world.’ Given the reasoning that his argument summarizes, is the ‘of the physical world’ qualification important? If so, why?

a. No, it’s not important. The reasoning leads equally to the conclusion that we have no knowledge of anything at all.

b. Yes, it’s important. We often have good evidence for what goes on in our own minds, in the form of the results of fMRI scans. So, the argument allows that we can sometimes know what goes on in our own minds, even if we can’t know what goes on outside our minds.

c. Yes, it’s important. According to the argument, we are never directly aware of electrons, atoms, or molecules. We only directly aware of middle-sized things, such as tables and chairs. We might know about tables, but not about electrons.

d. Yes, it’s important. According to the argument, we are never directly aware of physical objects. We are only directly aware of sense data (mental images, experiences, etc.), which are in our minds. We might know about sense data, but not about external things like tables.

Suppose that you are in a situation that is correctly described by the following decision matrix:

Coin lands heads (probability=.5)

Coin lands tails (probability=.5)

Play the game

utility=1,000,000

utility= -999,999

Don’t play the game

utility=0

utility=0

3. According to MaxEU:

a. morality requires you to play the game.

b. morality requires you not to play the game.

c. rationality requires you to play the game.

d. rationality requires you not to play the game.

4. In lecture, we discussed the Modest Response to the Argument from Evil. Initially, it seems plausible that some actual evils are gratuitous, on the grounds that we are unable to detect any justification for those evils, even after careful consideration. As Professor Gilmore explained in lecture, skeptical theists have replied to this by arguing that:

a. justifications for permitting the given evils are like dogs in a garage: if they were there, we would see them. So we are justified in believing that there is no justification for the evils in question.

b. justifications for permitting the given evils are like fleas in a garage: even if they were there, we probably wouldn’t see them. So we are not justified in believing that there is no justification for the evils in question.

c. the justification for permitting the evils is that they are necessary by-products of free will, whose value outweighs and compensates for the evils in question.

d. the justification for permitting evil is that God freely chose to do so, and whatever God freely chooses to do is justified, since free will is so valuable.

Argument (i)

P1 An action A is morally permissible if and only if no other action that is open to the agent of A at the time of A has a greater utility than A does.

P2 All human actions are causally determined by events in the distant past.

P3 If all human actions are causally determined by events in the distant past, then for any human action A that is actually performed, no other action aside from A is open to the agent of A at the time of A.

P4 If, for any human action A that is actually performed, no other action aside from A is open to the agent of A at the time of A, then for any human action A that is actually performed, no other action that is open to the agent of A has a greater utility than A does.

P5 Dylann Roof’s firing on church-goers is a human action that was actually performed.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

: . Dylann Roof’s firing on church-goers was morally permissible.

Most of us will want to say that this conclusion is false. But if the conclusion is false, there must be some specific problem with Argument (i). Different philosophical positions yield different verdicts about where the argument goes wrong.

5. According to libertarianism (interpreted as a view about free will, not as a political view):

a. P1, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

b. P2, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

c. P3, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

d. P4, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

6. According to non-consequentialist ethical theories, such as Ross’s theory or some theory that includes the Doctrine of Double Effect:

a. P1, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

b. P2, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

c. P3, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

d. P4, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

7. Assume that you are a utilitarian and a soft determinist. Assume that you grant that the Roof shooting was a human action that was actually performed. Assume that you deny the conclusion of Argument (i). Holding all that fixed, which of following should you consider to be the best criticism of Argument (i)?

a. P1 is false. Some actions (e.g., Roof’s) are not permissible even though no other action open to the agent had a higher utility.

b. P2 is false. If time could be rewound to instant t in 1950, for example, events could play out differently thereafter, without any violation of the laws of physics or any difference in how things were at t. The same goes for the time of Roof’s action. He could have refrained from doing it, without violating any laws of physics.

c. P3 is false. Even though Roof’s action was causally determined by events in the distant past, it was still a free action, since it was caused in the right way by his beliefs and desires; and there were other actions open to him, in the sense that, if he had wanted and chosen to do those other actions instead, he would have done them; nothing external would have stood in his way.

d. The conclusion is obviously false. Roof’s action caused a huge amount of pain and suffering for many innocent people, and there was no positive justification for it. It involved treating other people as mere means, and it involved treating people in a way that the agent would not like to be treated by them. Regardless of which normative ethical theory you accept — for example, utilitarianism, ethical egoism, Ross’s theory— you should agree that Roof’s action was deeply wrong.

8. According to the lectures,

a. numerical identity is represented by ‘=’ and applies only to numbers.

b. numerical identity is represented by ‘=’ and applies to everything, not just numbers.

c. strictly speaking, nothing is numerically identical even to itself.

d. numerical identity applies to everything, not just numbers. To say that x is numerically identical to y is just to say that x is exactly similar to y.

e. x is numerically identical to y if and only if x has at least one property in common with y.

9. According to the lectures,

a. numerical identity and qualitative identity are the same thing.

b. ‘x is numerically identical to y’ means that x and y are exactly alike, i.e., exactly similar. ‘x is qualitatively identical to y’ means that x and y are one and the same thing.

c. ‘x is numerically identical to y’ means that x and y are one and the same thing. ‘x is qualitatively identical to y’ means that x and y are exactly alike, i.e., exactly similar.

d. qualitative identity is just identity, as applied to properties, whereas numerical identity is just identity, as applied to numbers.

10. Soft determinists and libertarians agree that

a. the existence of free will is compatible with determinism.

b. people at least sometimes act freely.

c. the laws of nature are deterministic.

d. the existence of free will is not compatible with determinism.

e. the past, together with the laws of nature, do not determine the future.

11. Soft determinists and hard determinists agree that

a. the existence of free will is compatible with determinism.

b. people at least sometimes act freely.

c. the laws of nature are deterministic.

d. the existence of free will is not compatible with determinism.

e. the past, together with the laws of nature, do not determine the future.

12. Libertarians and hard determinists agree that

a. the existence of free will is compatible with determinism.

b. people at least sometimes act freely.

c. the laws of nature are deterministic.

d. the existence of free will is not compatible with determinism.

e. the past, together with the laws of nature, do not determine the future.

13. Sider’s example involving one million perfect duplicates of Hitler is meant to show that

a. if quantum mechanics is true, then the laws of nature are not deterministic. The past and present together with the laws of nature do not determine all the facts about which future events will occur. They only determine the facts about the probabilities of those events.

b. if quantum mechanics is true, then the laws of nature are deterministic. The past and present together with the laws of nature determine all the fact about which future events will occur.

c. agent causal libertarianism is plausible if quantum mechanics is true, but not otherwise.

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